When both sides refuse to yield.
Schelling studied strategic conflict, including how threats and commitments affect choices. Chicken illustrates the danger when each side prefers the other to back down.
Inside this model
Hold/hold pays −D each; hold/yield pays 5 and 0; yield/hold pays 0 and 5; yield/yield pays 2 each. Opponent choices are independent draws with the chosen probability. Pure equilibria are highlighted from both players' best responses.
Out in the world
A practical use
Two departments may threaten to block a shared plan unless the other concedes, even though stalemate harms both.
A useful lens. Not a universal law.
- A payoff table cannot capture real conflict, communication or credible commitment. This toy opponent never adapts to threats.
Associated thinkers
Further reading
Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.
Nobel committee — Schelling and strategic conflict ↗