Play again. Does cooperation survive?
Both players would benefit from mutual cooperation, yet each can gain by defecting in a single round. Repeated encounters make reputation and reciprocity relevant.
Inside this model
Mutual cooperation pays 3 each; mutual defection pays 1 each. A lone defector receives 5 and the cooperator 0. Tit for tat starts with cooperation, then copies the opponent's previous actual move. Noise independently flips each intended move.
Out in the world
A practical use
Recurring supplier relationships can reward reliability, while short-term incentives reward cutting corners. Try how reciprocal strategies respond to mistakes.
A useful lens. Not a universal law.
- The payoff table and strategies are fixed. This experiment does not establish one universally best strategy; communication, forgiveness and the end of a relationship can change outcomes.
Associated thinkers
Further reading
Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.
Robert Axelrod — The Evolution of Cooperation ↗