Trust changes the best move.
In an assurance game, cooperation is attractive when others cooperate. A safe alternative can keep both people in a less valuable outcome.
Inside this model
Joint/joint pays R to each. Joint/solo pays 0 and 3; solo/joint pays 3 and 0; solo/solo pays 3 each. The joint action has expected payoff pR; solo pays 3. Best-response cells mark pure Nash equilibria, allowing ties.
Out in the world
A practical use
Two firms may both benefit from adopting a compatible standard, yet each may wait for assurance that the other will invest.
A useful lens. Not a universal law.
- The opponent uses a fixed independent probability and does not learn. Payoffs are fictional and the model does not represent all trust relationships.
Further reading
Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.
MIT OpenCourseWare — Game Theory lecture notes ↗