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Screening Contracts.

Price two quality tiers and observe which contract each private customer type chooses.

Interactive experimentintuitiveField note ·
INTERACTIVE EXPERIMENT / M24

Screening Contracts

Price two quality tiers and observe which contract each private customer type chooses.

PLAY & EXPLAIN

Two customers privately value each quality unit at 4 and 8. Offer quality 1 or 2; production costs are 1 and 4. Each chooses the highest utility, or the outside option of zero. Ties favour higher quality.

26
818
Customers select their own contracts
Value per qualityLow utilityHigh utilityChosen qualitySeller profit
40-413
84428
Total seller profit
11
Different contracts chosen
Yes

Raise the high-quality price from 12 to 14. A customer can switch down rather than reveal willingness to pay through a survey. This fixed two-type menu is not a complete market model.

Only two fixed private types, two qualities and a declared tie rule are included; no complete equilibrium or welfare optimum is claimed.

THE SHORT VERSION

Screening Contracts, explained.

Screening uses a menu of choices to induce agents with private information to select options that reveal something about their type.

01 / THE MECHANISM

Why it happens

Customers value each quality unit at four or eight. Qualities one and two cost one and four to produce. Each customer maximises value times quality minus price, including a zero-utility outside option; ties favour higher quality.

Screening uses a menu of choices to induce agents with private information to select options that reveal something about their type.

Read the result

The customer chooses from the entire menu, including opting out. A seller cannot assign contracts simply by naming a target audience.

02 / FOLLOW IT THROUGH

A worked example

Two tiers and two private values

  1. Set quality-one price to four and quality-two price to twelve with the stated production costs.

  2. Inspect each customer’s utility from both tiers and the higher-quality tie rule to see separating choices.

  3. Raise the high price to fourteen and observe both customers selecting the lower tier, reducing total seller profit in this example.

OPTIONAL DEEPER DETAILGo deeper: inside the model

Inside this model

Customers value each quality unit at four or eight. Qualities one and two cost one and four to produce. Each customer maximises value times quality minus price, including a zero-utility outside option; ties favour higher quality.

03 / BEYOND THE EXPERIMENT

Where this idea is useful

A practical use

Design a service tier by checking whether high-value customers prefer it over the cheaper option, rather than assuming they self-identify.

CHECK YOUR INTUITION

A common misconception

THE TEMPTING CONCLUSION

“A high-value customer automatically buys the expensive tier.”

THE MORE USEFUL DISTINCTION

The customer compares net utilities across all options. A cheaper tier can provide more surplus even when willingness to pay is high.

What this explanation leaves out

  • Only two fixed private types, two qualities and a declared tie rule are included; no complete equilibrium or welfare optimum is claimed.
ONE MORE QUESTION

What role does the outside option play?

A negative-utility purchase is rejected in favour of zero utility, while the declared tie rule handles exact equality transparently.

TAKE THE IDEA WITH YOU

Would the customer you hope to upsell actually prefer your cheaper option?

Associated thinkers

Associated withJoseph Stiglitz ↗

Associations marked provisional are awaiting source review.

Further reading

Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.