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Dutch Auction.

Decide when to stop a descending auction clock before a scripted rival does.

Interactive experimentintuitiveField note ·
INTERACTIVE EXPERIMENT / M21

Dutch Auction

Decide when to stop a descending auction clock before a scripted rival does.

PLAY & EXPLAIN

Your private value is 80. The clock falls in five-unit ticks. Two rivals have hidden, fixed acceptance thresholds; they act when a tick reaches their threshold.

Current price
100
Your value
80

Accept now or risk losing the item at the next tick.

Rivals use disclosed-after-play scripted thresholds rather than strategic equilibrium bids; five-unit ticks determine the cheapest possible winning price.

THE SHORT VERSION

Dutch Auction, explained.

A Dutch auction sells to the first bidder who accepts a descending posted price.

01 / THE MECHANISM

Why it happens

Your private value is 80 and the price falls from 100 in five-unit ticks. Rival acceptance thresholds are 45 and 50. Accepting gives value minus price; reaching a rival threshold ends the sale first.

A Dutch auction sells to the first bidder who accepts a descending posted price.

Read the result

Your profit is eighty minus the accepted price; passing a rival’s threshold ends the opportunity rather than giving you a cheaper item.

02 / FOLLOW IT THROUGH

A worked example

Stop a descending price clock

  1. Lower the initial one-hundred-unit clock in five-unit ticks while your value stays eighty.

  2. Accept at fifty-five to win against the scripted highest rival threshold of fifty.

  3. In a reset attempt lower to fifty and observe the rival purchase, separating this bot demonstration from an equilibrium bidding prescription.

OPTIONAL DEEPER DETAILGo deeper: inside the model

Inside this model

Your private value is 80 and the price falls from 100 in five-unit ticks. Rival acceptance thresholds are 45 and 50. Accepting gives value minus price; reaching a rival threshold ends the sale first.

03 / BEYOND THE EXPERIMENT

Where this idea is useful

A practical use

Compare the tradeoff between a lower price and losing access to an item, while inspecting the precise clock and tie rules.

CHECK YOUR INTUITION

A common misconception

THE TEMPTING CONCLUSION

“Waiting always improves the auction outcome.”

THE MORE USEFUL DISTINCTION

A lower price improves surplus only if the item remains available. A rival can end the auction before the next acceptable tick.

What this explanation leaves out

  • Rivals use disclosed-after-play scripted thresholds rather than strategic equilibrium bids; five-unit ticks determine the cheapest possible winning price.
ONE MORE QUESTION

Why is fifty-five the cheapest winning price here?

The discrete clock lets a rival accept as soon as a tick reaches fifty. Fifty-five is the preceding tick, under the declared ordering rule.

TAKE THE IDEA WITH YOU

What information would change how long you were willing to wait?

Associated thinkers

Associated withPaul Milgrom ↗

Associations marked provisional are awaiting source review.

Further reading

Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.