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Hawk–Dove Game.

Compare fighting and yielding as the opponent mix changes.

Interactive experimentintuitiveField note ·
Preparing the experiment…
THE SHORT VERSION

Hawk–Dove Game, explained.

The hawk–dove game models escalation and yielding when the value of a resource competes with the cost of fighting.

01 / THE MECHANISM

Why it happens

An escalating strategy gains against a yielding opponent but may lose value in fights with other escalators. Its expected payoff therefore changes with the opponent mix, rather than being an inherent property of aggression.

When escalation is costly, the success of aggressive behavior depends on how often it meets another aggressive opponent.

Read the result

Move the hawk share and compare the two payoff curves at the selected mix. A higher fighting cost shifts their crossing. The display is an expected-payoff comparison, not a time evolution of the population.

02 / FOLLOW IT THROUGH

A worked example

Equal payoffs at half hawks

  1. Resource value ten and fighting cost twenty give hawk–hawk payoff minus five.

  2. At a 50% hawk mix, hawk payoff is 0.5×(-5)+0.5×10=2.5; dove payoff is 0.5×0+0.5×5=2.5.

  3. The equal-payoff fraction is value divided by cost in this model; it does not imply every real population must have that composition.

OPTIONAL DEEPER DETAILGo deeper: inside the model

Inside this model

Resource value is 10. Hawk versus hawk yields (10-cost)/2; hawk versus dove gets 10; dove versus hawk gets zero; two doves get 5 each. Expected payoffs average over the selected opponent mix.

03 / BEYOND THE EXPERIMENT

Where this idea is useful

A practical use

Competition that pays against yielding opponents may become costly when everyone escalates.

CHECK YOUR INTUITION

A common misconception

THE TEMPTING CONCLUSION

“One strategy is always more successful.”

THE MORE USEFUL DISTINCTION

Success depends on both the payoff structure and how often each opponent strategy is encountered.

What this explanation leaves out

  • This is a one-shot expected-payoff model, not an evolutionary simulation or a recommendation for human conflict.
ONE MORE QUESTION

Does the chart predict evolutionary change?

No. That would require explicit reproduction or adaptation dynamics in addition to these payoff comparisons.

TAKE THE IDEA WITH YOU

How does widespread adoption of a competitive strategy change the incentive that made it attractive?

Associated thinkers

Further reading

Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.