Make an offer the other side accepts.
Ultimatum experiments separate the proposer's choice from a responder's power to reject. Assumptions about acceptance determine which offers succeed.
Inside this model
The responder accepts when offered at least its threshold. Acceptance pays the proposer 100−offer and the responder offer; rejection pays both zero. The threshold is a user-defined deterministic policy, not a prediction about fairness preferences.
Out in the world
A practical use
A seller's theoretically profitable proposal can fail if the buyer views its terms as unacceptable.
A useful lens. Not a universal law.
- Real thresholds are unknown, context-dependent and variable. The model does not claim a universal fair split or reproduce measured human behavior.
Further reading
Explore the original research or the teaching reference behind this experiment.
Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze — An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining ↗